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THE EFFECT OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT ON TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN INDIAN COUNTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
Long before the European expansion across the North American
continent, Native Americans evolved complex relationships between
tribes and the lands they occupied.' The tribes depended upon hunting,
fishing, and gathering to feed, clothe, and shelter their numbers.2 The
ability to perform these activities has been characterized by the United
States Supreme Court as "not much less necessary to the existence of the
Indians than the atmosphere they breathed."3
As the white settlers steadily advanced westward across the
continent in the mid-I 800s, the young American nation began to initiate
policies designed to suffocate the tribes.4  The settlers forced the
1. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkrnan, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"--How Long a
Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601, 605-06 (1975). Note in particular the significance
of land in the religious life of various tribes. Id. at 605 n.17.
2. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 441 (Rennard Strickland
& Charles F. Wilkinson eds., 1982).
3. Id. at 442 (quoting United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)).
4. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 608-12 (describing the alteration in the
balance of power between the United States and the tribes, and its subsequent impact on
treaty negotiations). See also FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE
HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 41 (1994) (noting that because Indians had sided with
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Indians5 on to reservations much smaller than the vast territories they
had occupied prior to the arrival of the Europeans.' During this time,
the United States government and the various tribes entered into a series
of treaties and agreements, allocating "rights to valuable resources ...
[in] land, minerals, wildlife and water."7 The Indians, whose traditional
customs and practices were essential to their way of life, strongly sought
to preserve their hunting, fishing, and gathering rights formally on
paper.'
These treaties and agreements, however, were often marred by
incidents of bribery, threats, and outright fraud by the United States
"negotiators."9 Indians were often coerced into signing treaties, replete
with ambiguous language, that left their rights to hunt and fish in a state
of flux."0 This resulted in a federal-Indian struggle for control over the
the British during the American Revolution, the United States viewed the tribes as
conquered peoples). Wilkinson and Volkman present the Indian perspective on American
westward expansion, noting:
From the Indians' point of view, it was a Hobson's choice. Theoretically, they
could keep their land and be overrun by white settlers. Or, they could sell their land,
their ancestral heritage, and remove to a new site. Certainly no happy solution to
such a dilemma could be found under the best of circumstances.
Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 609-10 (footnotes omitted).
5. Although I realize that the more correct term to use is "Native Americans," to be
consistent with the scholarship and case law in this area I have used the terms "Indians"
and 'Native Americans" interchangeably. In fear of having my Note labeled "politically
incorrect" by today's standards, I telephoned Robert Anderson, the Associate Solicitor in
the Division of Indian Affairs at the United States Department of the Interior. Anderson
assured me that the term "Indian" can properly be used to refer historically to the tribes
in the 48 contiguous states. The term "Native American" is broader and can be used to
include Native Alaskans and Native Hawaiians. Telephone Interview with Robert T.
Anderson, Associate Solicitor, United States Department of the Interior, Division ofIndian
Affairs (June 19, 1996).
6. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 609. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 28-29
(noting a "policy of separating Indians from non-Indians"). See, e.g., PRUCHA, supra note
4, at 188 ("As a result of the treaties, the Potawatomis were concentrated on ... small
reservations.").
7. COHEN, supra note 2, at vii.
8. See id. at 442. See infra text accompanying note 65 (discussing the importance of
hunting and fishing for Indian tribes).
9. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 610. Also cited as barriers to the
conclusion of fair and solemn treaties are language and interpretation discrepancies, and
unequal bargaining positions. Id. at 610-11.
10. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 442 (noting "frequent clashes" between tribes and
states regarding fishing and hunting rights). In addition to problems with the language of
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natural and wildlife resources contained on Indian reservations which
continues to this day." At first, the Indians clashed with the states in
which their reservations were located over issues of tribal sovereignty
and the reach of state regulatory authority. 2 More recently, Indians
have strenuously resisted the impact of federal legislation upon their
lives. 3 Specifically, Indian tribes believe that their historic rights to
hunt and fish are being infringed upon, either directly 4 or indirectly, 5
by federal conservation statutes such as the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) 6 and the Eagle Protection Act.'"
While much of the beauty of Indian culture and tradition has been
the treaties, other difficulties impinged upon Indian rights:
The legal force of Indian treaties has not assured their enforcement. Some
important treaties were negotiated but never ratified by the Senate, or ratified only
after long delay. Treaties were sometimes consummated by methods amounting to
bribery, or signed by representatives of only small parts of the signatory tribes ....
[T]he courts will not inquire into whether an Indian tribe was properly represented
during negotiation of a ratified treaty or whether such a treaty was procured by fraud
or duress.
Id. at 63 (citations omitted). Courts have, however, recognized the effect of unequal
bargaining power on the content of treaties and have held that the language must be
construed in favor of the tribes. Id. at 444.
11. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 607 (discussing condemnation of tribal
lands by federal agencies).
12. COHEN, supra note 2, at 442.
13. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 607 nn.23-27 (listing cases claiming
rights violations).
14. Congress may abrogate treaty rights directly. CONFERENCE OF WESTERN
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 251 (Nicholas J. Spaeth et al.
eds., 1993) [hereinafter AIL DESKBOOK]. Courts require clear evidence, either express or
implied, of congressional intent to abrogate reserved rights. Id.
15. See id. at 253-56 (describing administrative regulations effecting hunting and
fishing rights).
16. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)). Subsequent cites to sections
within the ESA will use the precodification section numbers, followed by the U.S.C.
citation.
17. Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250 (1940) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1994)). See generally United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745
(i 986) (holding that Indian defendant could not assert a defense based on treaty rights in
charges arising from shooting four bald eagles on his reservation because the Eagle
Protection Act abrogated any such right); United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1492
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that where conservation measures are necessary to protect endan-
gered wildlife, Government can intervene to limit Indian hunting and fishing rights).
Washington University Open Scholarship
306 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 50:303
stripped away over time, largely as a result of their forced relocation to
reservations, the Indians have clung tightly to their treaty hunting and
fishing rights.' 8 Indeed, these rights have remained enormously vital
to them, both for subsistence needs and for their livelihood.19 Today,
Indians in many areas of the country, the Pacific Northwest in particular,
depend almost exclusively upon these treaty rights as their only means
to earn a living." Against this backdrop, a multitude of complex
"Indian law" cases have arisen.2' These cases have struggled to clarify
the scope of Indian treaty hunting and fishing rights, and to balance the
tribes' interests against competing federal interests in wildlife
conservation.22 At present, however, no coherent analytic framework
can readily be gleaned.'
This Note proposes an analytic framework with which to evaluate
18. See Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 602-06 (describing Indian land as a
sanctuary "where Indian customs and traditions are supreme").
19. "Fish, particularly salmon, still are an integral part of Indian life. As some other
aspects of that life have disappeared, the role of fish and fishing has assumed even more
importance-both economic and symbolic, and the symbolic may well be more significant
than the economic.' AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITrEE, UNCOMMON
CONTROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND NISQUALLY
INDIANS 71 (1970).
20. See id. at 66-71 (describing the lifestyle of Indians living in the Pacific Northwest).
For an in-depth discussion of the adverse impact the ESA listing of certain species of the
Columbia River anadromous fish will have on Indian fishing rights, see Robert J. Miller,
Comment, Speaking With Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the Endangered
Species Act, 70 OR. L. REV. 543 (1991).
21. Sally J. Johnson, Note, Honoring Treaty Rights and Conserving Endangered
Species After United States v. Dion, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 179, 190 n.109 (1992) ("One
source counted 63 United States Supreme Court cases between a casebook's first edition
in 1973 and the third edition in 1991.").
22. See infra part II.A-C.
23. Felix S. Cohen, one of the greatest scholars ever to enter the domain of Indian
Law, described it as an "extraordinarily rich and diverse field." COHEN, supra note 2, at
1. Cohen elaborated, saying:
[Tihe cases, both old and new, weave a fabric with threads drawn from
constitutional law, international law, federal jurisdiction, conflict of laws, real
property, contracts, corporations, torts, domestic relations, procedure, trust law,
intergovernmental relations, sovereign immunity, and taxation. Typically, as those
fields meld into Indian law, the blend produces a new variation that could not have
been predicted by analysis of the applicable law from those other fields.
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the ESA's effect on tribal economic development in Indian country.24
The impact of the ESA on the exercise of Native American treaty rights
to hunt and fish has been considered in numerous law review articles25
and a pair of published court decisions. 26  Far less attention has been
paid to a related issue: the extent to which the ESA's takings
prohibition27 limits economic development that results in the incidental
taking of a listed species.' In other words, tribes hold full rights of
24. Felix Cohen explains that "[w]hile the public is probably most familiar with the
term Indian Reservation, for most jurisdictional purposes the governing legal term is
'Indian country."' Id. at 27.
25. See generally Johnson, supra note 21, at 185-88 (concluding that the ESA does
not abrogate treaty hunting and fishing rights and proposing an alternative to honor
traditional treaty rights while conserving endangered species); Robert Laurence, The
Abrogation of Indian Treaties by Federal Statutes Protective of the Environment, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 859, 860 (1991) [hereinafter Laurence, The Abrogation ofIndian Treaties]
("examin[ing] whether treaty rights should be set aside in the face of a federal statute of
general applicability which does not mention Indian treaties."); Robert Laurence, The Bald
Eagle, the Florida Panther and the Nation's Word: An Essay on the "Quiet" Abrogation
of Indian Treaties and the Proper Reading of United States v. Dion, 4 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Laurence, The BaldEagle] (discussing Congress' different
methods of treaty abrogation and referring to abrogations as "quiet" when there is no
renegotiation with the tribes, no compensation, and no definite evidence that Congress was
thinking of treaties when it passed the legislation); Miller, supra note 18 (exploring the
adverse effects ESA listing has upon traditional Indian fishing rights).
26. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (determining that the Eagle
Protection Act abrogated treaty hunting rights); United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485,
1492 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that the ESA abrogated Seminole hunting rights).
27. The ESA has three provisions relevant to "takings": (1) ESA § 3(19) defines
"take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct." ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19); (2) ESA § 9
defines prohibited acts, including "tak[ing] any [listed species] within the United States."
ESA § 9(a)(IXB), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(aXI)(B); (3) ESA § 10 allows the government to
permit prohibited takings if they are "incidental to, and not the purpose of" a lawful
activity. ESA § 10(a)(IXB), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). Thus, the general definition in
ESA § 3 does not distinguish between direct and incidental takings; however, § 10 carves
out a limited exception for "incidental takings." In order for the exception in § 10 to
apply, a person committing a taking must first receive a permit from the government.
ESA § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539. For the purposes of this Note, the hypothetical proposed in
part III.C assumes that the taking occurs incidental to development on the reservation, and
that the Indians have purposely not applied for a § 10 permit.
28. This issue surfaced in September 1994 in Oregon. Tribal fishing of non-listed
salmon stocks resulted in the incidental takings of listed salmon. Telephone Interview with
Steven Hoffman, Attorney in the Solicitor's Office of the United States Department of the
Interior, Division of Conservation and Wildlife (Feb. 2, 1995). The tribes argued that the
federal government could only limit such incidental takings attributable to the exercise of
their treaty fishing rights if the government fully regulated or eliminated all non-Indian
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possession to their lands,29 and often pursue economic opportunities to
improve the conditions of individual tribe members.3" As the tribes
develop their lands3' they face probable conflict with the Department
of the Interior if the tribal lands provide habitat to ESA-listed species. 2
There are several interests involved in this scenario. First, the tribes
have attributes of sovereignty within the United States territorial
borders33 even though treaties govern much of the relations between
tribes and the federal government.34 Second, the United States has
recognized the rights of tribes to economic self-sufficiency. 5 Third, the
United States has the power, through the ESA, to preserve dwindling
species and their habitats.36
This Note analyzes the difficult question of whether the federal
government should permit tribes to pursue economic development
without considering the impact on endangered species and their
habitats.37 Part II provides an historical analysis of Indian treaty law.
activities which result in incidental takings. Because the parties settled the case by
agreeing to continue discussing the issue, the courts have not addressed the issue. Id.
29. COHEN, supra note 2, at 472 (noting six means by which tribes acquired real
property interests). See also Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835)
("[Indians'] right of occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee simple of the whites.").
30. See Fox Butterfield, Tribal Investment Bank Helps Indians andMaine, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 4, 1985, § 1, at 20 (describing Penobscott tribe's investments after winning $81.5
million as "compensation for lands taken by the United States govemment"); Bill Day, The
Great Emancipator, Bus. REC. (Des Moines), June 19, 1995, § 1, at 14 (describing
benefits of casino to Mesquakis tribe).
31. Butterfield, supra note 30 (noting the Penobscotts have built an ice hockey rink
on a river island, and plan to build an audio cassette factory); Day, supra note 30 (noting
that the Mesquakis tribe has built a medical clinic and apartments on their land, and plan
to install a sewer system and build a school).
32. See infra part III.C (posing a hypothetical based upon this issue).
33. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 244 n.25.
34. Id. at 242-44 (describing limitations on tribal sovereignty as a result of treaties).
But see David Lamb, A Tribe that Means Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at Al
(discussing Maine tribes multi-million dollar settlements with the United States for land
taken in violation of 1790 treaty).
35. See, e.g., Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4)-(5) (1994)
(recognizing tribes' interests in economic development and self sufficiency and finding that
tribes have exclusive rights to regulate gaming on Indian lands).
36. ESA § 2(a)(4); 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) ("T]he United States has pledged itself as
a sovereign state ... to conserve ... the various species ... facing extinction . . ").
37. In answering this question it is necessary to consider the following additional
issues: What did the United States mean when it granted the Indians, expressly or
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Part III presents an overview of the ESA and its impact on tribal
economic development. Additionally, Part III poses a hypothetical that
presents the tensions between tribal interests in economic development
and the federal government's interest in preserving endangered species.
Part IV examines the previous treatment of the conflict between tribal
interests and the ESA in direct takings situations. Part V applies the
direct takings analysis to the incidental taking situation presented in the
hypothetical and proposes a means by which the federal government and
the tribes can cooperate to better protect both the tribes' acknowledged
treaty rights and wildlife resources.
II. THE ORIGINS AND SCOPE OF INDIAN
HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS
Part II outlines the historical development of present day tribal
rights. Section A discusses the sources of these rights with emphasis on
the treaties wherein the federal government made pledges in exchange for
the tribes relinquishing territory. Section A also discusses the principles
the courts developed in interpreting treaties, and the judicial recognition
of the trust relationship between the federal government and Indian
tribes. Section B examines congressional power to abrogate treaties and
the Supreme Court's rule to determine whether a federal law abrogates
treaty rights. Finally, Section C briefly examines whether the ESA
abrogates tribal hunting and fishing rights.
A. The Sources of Tribal Hunting and Fishing Rights
The federal government guaranteed tribes' hunting and fishing rights
on numerous occasions38 and through a variety of devices, including
treaties,39 agreements, 40 statutes, 4' and executive orders.42  These
impliedly, treaty rights to hunt and fish? What did the Indians understand their rights to
be? See infra part II.A.
38. See, e.g., PRUCHA, supra note 4, 448-500 (listing 366 treaties ratified between
1778 and 1868).
39. COHEN, supra note 2, at 444-45. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,
737 (1986) (describing an 1858 treaty between the United States and the Yankton Tribe);
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S.
658, 662 n.2 (1979) (noting six treaties with 20 tribes in 1854 and 1855); Puyallup Tribe
v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (construing the 1854 Treaty
of Medicine Creek); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (discussing an 1859
treaty with Yakima Nation).
19961
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guarantees 43 preserved Indians' rights" to hunt and fish on their
reservations and at traditional off-reservation locations.45 The tribes and
individual Indians, however, have struggled to enforce these guaran-
tees,46 asserting that the passage of time has not diminished the force
of the treaties.47
40. COHEN, supra note 2, at 445. See also PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 508-16 (listing
73 ratified agreements). See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975) (deciding
the effect of an 1891 agreement on the hunting rights of defendant Indians); Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (construing the water rights to the Fort Belknap
Reservation under an 1888 agreement).
41. COHEN, supra note 2, at 445-46. See also Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan,
369 U.S. 45 (1962) (discussing fishing rights under federal statutes); Alaska Pac. Fisheries
v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918) (construing a federal statute granting reservation lands
to the Metlakatla Indians).
42. COHEN, supra note 2, at 445.
Congress passed legislation ending the era of formal treaty-making with the Indian tribes
in 1871. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, cl. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (1994)) ("[HIereafter no Indian nation or tribe.., shall be... recognized as
an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty
... ."). See generally PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 305-10 (discussing the legislative debate).
Because the federal government could no longer use formal treaties, it turned to executive
orders, statutes, and agreements. Id. at 311-33 (describing treaty substitutes). As a result,
courts have applied the same liberal rules of construction used with treaties, see supra note
10, to the construction of these less familiar agreements to confirm the existence of
hunting and fishing rights. See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975)
("The change [from a treaty to an agreement] in no way affected Congress' plenary powers
to legislate on problems of Indians, including legislating the ratification of contracts of the
Executive Branch with Indian tribes. .. ").
43. In addition to the express guarantees contained in treaties, agreements, statutes, and
executive orders, courts have recognized "aboriginal claims" based on "immemorial
custom and practice." COHEN, supra note 2, at 442. See also Lac Courte Oreilles Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 351-52 (7th Cir.) (distinguish-
ing treaty-recognized rights from aboriginal rights), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983);
State v. Coffee, 556 P.2d 1185, 1189-94 (Idaho 1976) (finding that the aboriginal rights
of the Kootenai Tribe were extinguished by the ratification of a treaty to which the tribe
was not a party).
44. Although Indian hunting and fishing rights have emerged from various sources,
see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text, for the purposes of this Note the terms
"treaty" and "treaty rights" will be used to refer to such rights, regardless of their source.
45. Application of the Endangered Species Act to Native Americans with Treaty
Hunting and Fishing Rights, 87 Interior Dec. 525, 526 (1980) [hereinafter Martz Opinion].
46. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
47. Treaties guarantee rights forever. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 1, at 602.
For example, in frequently cited prose, Senator Sam Houston said that treaty rights were
guaranteed "[a]s long as water flows, or grass grows upon the earth, or the sun rises." Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/11
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Each judicial interpretation of the reach of the Indians' treaty rights
is meaningful to the on-going federal-Indian dispute. As a general rule,
courts construe these treaties, not as grants of rights to Indians, but as
instruments preserving rights not expressly granted to the federal
government.48 In United States v Winans,49 the Supreme Court estab-
lished the standard for examining treaty hunting and fishing rights.50
The Court examined a provision, common to many Indian treaties,
granting the Yakima Indians the off-reservation privilege of taking fish
at all their "usual and accustomed places."5' The Court emphasized the
immense cultural significance of fishing to the Yakima way of life.52
This right to fish in the controverted locations, reserved to the Yakima
Indians in the 1859 treaty, 53 "was not a grant of rights to the Indians,
but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted."54
In other words, the treaty placed a limitation on the rights already
possessed by the Indians, but it did not divest the Indians of these
rights.55
Unless an Indian treaty is subsequently modified or terminated, its
original terms remain in effect.' Federal courts have acknowledged,
however, that the treaty-making process was often fraught with problems,
(citing CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., Ist Sess., app. 202 (1854)). See also COHEN, supra note
2, at 68.
48. COHEN, supra note 2, at 444.
49. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
50. See id. at 380-81.
51. Id. at 378.
52. Id. at 381-82. "The right to resort to the fishing places ... was a part of larger
rights ... which were not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the
atmosphere they breathed." Id. at 381.
53. Id. at 377-78.
54. Id. at 381.
55. Id. These rights were to continue regardless of future ownership on nonreservation
lands. Id.
56. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (1994)). While Congress' primary purpose for this Act was to terminate
treaty-making with the Indian tribes, this statute additionally clarified that "no obligation
of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to
March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired." 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994). See also
COHEN, supra note 2, at 62-63.
19961
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such as exploitation," large disparities in negotiation skills, 8 and
knowledge of the language.59 For these reasons, in Washington v,
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,' the
Supreme Court held that an Indian treaty must be construed, "not
according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but
in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the
Indians."'" Thus, for example, in Menominee Tribe v. United States,62
57. In Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899), Justice Gray cautioned that, in
construing an Indian treaty, one must bear in mind that:
[T]he negotiations for the treaty are conducted, on the part of the United States, an
enlightened and powerful nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy, masters of
a written language, understanding the modes and forms of creating the various
technical estates known to their law, and assisted by an interpreter employed by
themselves; that the treaty is drawn up by them and in their own language; that the
Indians, on the other hand, are a weak and dependent people, who have no written
language and are wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of legal expression, and whose
only knowledge of the terms in which the treaty is framed is that imparted to them
by the interpreter employed by the United States ....
Id.
58. The white negotiators often invited the Indians to rely on the good faith of the
United States to protect their hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 667 (1979).
While negotiating the Treaty of Point-No-Point, Isaac Stevens, the first Governor and first
Superintendent of Indian Affairs of the Washington Territory, id. at 666, stated:
Are you not my children and also children of the Great Father? What will I not
do for my children, and what will you not for yours? Would you not die for them?
This paper is such as a man would give to his children and I will tell you why. This
paper gives you a home. Does not a father give his children a home?... This paper
secures your fish. Does not a father give food to his children?
Id. at 667 n.1 1 (citation omitted).
59. E.g., United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd,
520 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). A series of treaties in
the Puget Sound region were conducted as follows:
Since ... the vast majority of Indians at the treaty councils did not speak or
understand English, the treaty provisions and the remarks of the treaty commissioners
were interpreted ... to the Indians in the Chinook jargon and then translated into
native languages by Indian interpreters. Chinook jargon, a trade medium of limited
vocabulary and simple grammar, was inadequate to express precisely the legal effects
of the treaties, although the general meaning of treaty language could be explained.
Id. at 356.
60. 443 U.S. 658 (1979):
61. Id. at 676 (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)). See also Washington
v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 484 (1979); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681,
684-85 (1942); Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198-99 (1919); United States
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the Supreme Court stated that, although the 1854 treaty did not mention
hunting and fishing rights, the language, "to be held as Indian lands are
held," '63 impliedly includes the right of Indians to engage in these
activities."
Hunting and fishing rights span a spectrum ranging from takings for
religious or recreational purposes, to commercial fisheries operated solely
for economic gain.65  Therefore, courts interpret the scope of the
Indians' treaty hunting and fishing rights broadly to enable the Indians
to remain self-sufficient.' Consistent with this purpose, courts interpret
the parties' intent by examining the activities the Indians engaged in
prior to and at the time the treaty was made.67 If courts make the
determination that the parties intended to grant hunting or fishing rights,
the tribes are then allowed to continue to modernize their methods of
hunting and fishing as long as they can demonstrate a history of updating
v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905).
62. 391 U.S. 404 (1968). In Menominee, the Tribe brought an action to recover
damages arising from the loss of hunting and fishing rights on their Wisconsin reservation.
Id. at 407. The Menominee were granted their reservation by the Treaty of Wolf River
in 1854. Id. at 405. The Court was required to determine the effect of a congressional
act terminating federal supervision over the tribe. Id. at 408. Wisconsin argued that the
Indians were subject to the state hunting and fishing regulations. Id. at 407.
63. Id. at 406 (quoting Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 388 F.2d 988,
1002 (CL Cf. 1967)). "[T~he words 'to be held as Indian lands are held' sum up in a
single phrase the familiar provisions of earlier treaties which recognized hunting and
fishing as normal incidents of Indian life." Id. at 406 n.2. (quoting the Solicitor General's
brief and citing Treaty with the Choctaw Indians, Jan. 3, 1786, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, art.
3, 7 Stat. 21, 21; Treaty with the Shawnee Indians, Jan. 31, 1786, U.S.-Shawnee Nation,
art. 6, 7 Stat. 26, 27; Treaty with the Wyandot Indians, Jan. 9, 1789, U.S.-Wyandot Tribe,
art. 4, 7 Stat. 28, 29; Treaty with the Wyandot Indians, Aug. 3, 1795, U.S.-Wyandot Tribe,
art. 5, 7 Stat. 49, 52; Treaty with the Osage Indians, Nov. 10, 1808, U.S.-Osage Tribe, art.
8, 7 Stat. 107, 109; Treaty with the Comanche Indians, Aug. 24, 1835, U.S.-Comanche
Nation, art. 4, 7 Stat. 474, 474-75).
64. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 406 ("The essence of the Treaty ... was that the
Indians were authorized to maintain on the new lands ceded to them... their way of life
which included hunting and fishing.") (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court noted that
in terminating federal supervision of the tribe, Congress declined to expressly preserve
treaty hunting and fishing rights. Id. at 408. The Court held, nonetheless, that the tribe
reserved these rights, absent an express declaration by Congress of its intent to abrogate
them. Id. at 412-13.
65. Martz Opinion, supra note 45, at 526.
66. COHEN, supra note 2, at 446.
67. Id. at 44647.
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them.68
The courts, however, must determine whether a specific individual
or tribe has the right to exercise tribal treaty hunting and fishing rights
on a case by case basis.69 A court's interpretation of an Indian treaty
rests largely upon its evaluation of several important factors: the nature
of the treaty right at issue; whether the right is held exclusively by the
tribe in common with all citizens of the territory; the status of the
individual; the nature of the taking; whether the taking occurred on or off
the reservation; and any applicable conservation statutes or regula-
tions.7"
Treaty interpretation further requires recognition of the "unique trust
relationship" between the tribes and the federal government through its
68. Id. at 447 (noting tribes can utilize fishing nets, modem boats, and any other
modem technique).
69. Id. In developing this section I have relied on information received from Associate
Solicitor, Robert L. Baum, United States Dep't of the Interior, Division of Conservation
and Wildlife, Address at the 19th Annual Federal Bar Assoc. Indian Law Conference 4
(April 7, 1994) (speech outline on file with author).
In his address, Baum compares United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 900 (1985), and rev'd in part, 476 U.S. 734 (1986)
[hereinafter Dion I] (holding that while the Yankton Sioux tribe has the right to hunt on
the reservation for eagles for non-commercial purposes, this right does not extend to
hunting for commercial purposes) and United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486, 488 (9th
Cir. 1976) (holding that treaty hunting rights did not include the right to sell eagles
commercially) with United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 662 (D. Minn. 1991)
(distinguishing Dion land Top Sky by citing "ample evidence" that the Chippewa believed
that their treaty rights included the right to take and sell migratory birds and their feathers).
Baum, supra, at 4 n.4.
70. See Martz Opinion, supra note 45, at 526 (listing the important factors). See also
COHEN, supra note 2, at 450-55 (discussing off-reservation rights and rights held in
common with all citizens of the territory).
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agency, the Department of the Interior.7 ' The concept of a trust
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes first
emerged in 183172 with the Supreme Court's decision in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia.73 The Cherokee Nation brought an original action
before the Supreme Court to enjoin the enforcement of state laws on
lands guaranteed to the tribe by a treaty.74 Chief Justice Marshall,"
wrote that the court lacked original jurisdiction.76 He reasoned that,
although the tribe was a "distinct political society" and thus a "state,5
77
the tribe was neither a state of the United States nor a foreign state.78
Rather, Marshall defined the tribes as existing "in a state of pupilage.
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
71. Baum, supra note 69, at 13. The Department of the Interior's responsibilities for
trust resources were recently clarified by a Secretarial Order. Id. Order No. 3175 requires
the component bureaus and offices of the Department:
inter alia, (1) to "operate within a government to government relationship with
federally recognized Indian tribes"; (2) to be "aware of the impact of their plans,
projects, programs or activities on Indian trust resources"; (3) to "explicitly" address
any anticipated effects on trust resources when engaged in the planning of any
proposed project or action; and (4) "to consult with the recognized tribal government
with jurisdiction over the trust property that the proposal may effect .... "
Id. (citing Order of the Secretary of the Interior No. 3175 (Nov. 8, 1993)). For a
discussion of the development of the trust relationship and the ways it limits congressional
power, see COHEN, supra note 2, at 220-28.
72. COHEN, supra note 2, at 220.
73. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
74. Id. at 19-20.
75. Although frequently cited, this opinion did not capture the votes of a majority or
even a plurality of the Court; there was a 2-2-2 split among the six participating justices.
DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 137 (3d ed.
1993). Justices Marshall and McLean viewed the tribes as "domestic dependent nations."
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16; Justices Johnson and Baldwin recognized the
tribes as possessing no sovereignty at all; GETCHES ET AL., supra, at 137; Justices
Thompson and Story, equated the Cherokee Nation with a foreign nation and thus,
possessing sovereignty. Id.
76. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 19 ("mhe framers of our Constitution had
not the Indian tribes in view, when they opened the Courts of the Union to controversies
between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states.").
77. Id. at 15. Counsel for the Tribe argued that the Cherokees were a foreign nation
and thus able to bring suit under the Supreme Court's Article 3 original jurisdiction. Id.
78. Id. at 16, 19.
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guardian. 79
B. Congressional Power to Abrogate Indian Treaties
Notwithstanding this federal trust responsibility to the Indian tribes,
Congress may unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties.80 Congress' power
over the tribes and their property further encompasses Congress' ability
to terminate its trust obligation.8' In order to survive constitutional
scrutiny, however, Congress must compensate a tribe if, in abrogating a
treaty, it takes a recognized property right.82
"[T]he intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly
79. Id. at 16. The trust principles established by this case have been applied in many
subsequent decisions to define and protect the rights of Indian tribes and individuals.
COHEN, supra note 2, at 220. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974)
(noting that as long as special treatment for the tribes "can be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments
will not be disturbed"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 581 (1832) (noting that
the Cherokees "placed themselves under the protection of the United States").
80. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S 553, 566 (1903).
The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably
such power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only
justify the government in disregarding the stipulation of the treaty, but may demand,
in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so.
Id. at 566. See generally Reid P. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust
Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1227-29 (1975) (criticizing the Lone
Wolfapproach in favor of a broad trustee rule).
81. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (discussing
the Ute Partition Act terminating federal supervision of tribal property); Menominee Tribe
v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (discussing the impact of termination on
treaty hunting and fishing rights); United States v. Seminole Nation, 299 U.S. 417, 428-29
(1937) (discussing liquidation and distribution of tribal property); United States v. Nice,
241 U.S. 591, 598 (1916) (discussing the effect of termination on federal regulation of
alcohol on reservation).
82. E.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 421 (1980) (upholding Court
of Claims application of the "good faith effort" test to require compensation to the Sioux
Nation for appropriation of the Black Hills). But cf Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,
348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955). The Tee-Hit-Ton Court held that property rights based
exclusively on aboriginal title were not compensable. Id. at 288-89. By contrast, rights
created through congressional action, such as treaty rights, must be compensated. Id at
277-78.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/11
THE EFFECT OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
imputed to the Congress." ' Thus, the mere fact that Congress holds
the power to abrogate Indian treaty rights does not mean that every
potentially inconsistent statute constitutes an abrogation. 4 Instead, the
Court requires that Congress' intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights
be "clear and plain." '  In United States v. Dion (Dion 1JJ),86 the Su-
preme Court acknowledged the differing standards it has used to
determine how Congress may demonstrate such a clear and plain
intent.87 Although the Court prefers an "explicit statement by Con-
gress" to abrogate a treaty, it does not require one.8 The Court will
find congressional intent sufficient to abrogate a treaty as long as
compelling evidence can be readily gleaned from "the statute's 'legisla-
tive history,' . . . 'surrounding circumstances,' . . . [or] 'the face of the
Act."' 89 Dion Iif establishes an important three-part test for finding
treaty abrogation in the absence of express congressional intent: "What
is essential is [1 ] clear evidence that [2] Congress actually considered the
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty
rights on the other, and [3] chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating
the treaty."'  This contemporary test, also referred to as the "actual
consideration and choice test,"9' remains the standard for determining
83. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 413 (quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S.
138, 160 (1934)). The Court also stated: "We find it difficult to believe that Congress,
without explicit statement, would subject the United States to a claim for compensation
." Id. (citation omitted).
84. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 84 (1981).
See also Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) ("Absent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely
reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights .... ).
85. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (Dion 111). See also COHEN,
supra note 2, at 223 (explaining that although courts have not firmly articulated how a
clear and plain intent must be demonstrated, "the weight of authority indicates that such
an intent can also be found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in the
legislative history of a statute").
86. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
87. Id. at 739.
88. Id. (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942)).
89. Id. (citations omitted). See also COHEN, supra note 2, at 223.
90. Dion III, 476 U.S. at 739-40. See also Miller, supra note 20, at 566-67 (breaking
down the Dion III test and discussing the probable abrogation of treaty rights under the
ESA).
91. Laurence, The Bald Eagle, supra note 25, at 12. See also Johnson, supra note 21,
at 183-85.
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when an Indian treaty has been effectively abrogated by congressional
action.
C. The ESA and Treaty Rights
One area brimming with controversy is the extent to which the ESA
conflicts with Indian treaty rights for economic development through,
inter alia, hunting and fishing.92 One commentator has suggested that,
in the aftermath of Dion III, the Court would have to apply the actual
consideration and choice test to determine if the ESA abrogates treaty
rights to hunt and fish particular species protected by the statute.93
It is possible, however, that the question of abrogation need not
arise.94 An important rule of construction requires that a statute and an
Indian treaty be construed in harmony to the extent possible.9 s There-
fore, as long as no irreconcilable conflict exists between a treaty and the
statute,96 both can be given their full effect.97 The Solicitor's Office
of the Department of the Interior has applied this rule to the ESA-tribal
dispute, arguing that no conflict between the ESA and treaty hunting and
fishing rights exists because, as a matter of law, Indian treaty rights
simply do not extend to the takings of species which are threatened with
92. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
93. Johnson, supra note 21, at 181. Johnson noted that a court would have to ask:
"In passing the ESA, did Congress give actual consideration to the conflict between
conserving species and Indian treaty rights, and choose to resolve that conflict by
abrogating the treaty rights?" Id. at 185.
94. Martz Opinion, supra note 45, at 527.
95. Id. (citing United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924)).
96. For example, in the case of a direct taking, a strong argument can be made that
there is a conflict between the treaty right to take a species and the ESA's provisions
protecting such a species. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986)
(concluding that Congress, by enacting the Eagle Protection Act, abrogated the tribe's
hunting and fishing rights). By contrast, in the indirect taking situation, Indians may or
may not have a treaty right to engage in the conduct that is resulting in the indirect taking
of a listed species. If a court determines that the Indians retain a right to engage in the
conduct, then it should apply the direct takings analysis. If, however, the Indian's conduct
is not protected, the Indian must cease his activities immediately to avoid further
jeopardizing the status of the listed species. See also Martz Opinion, supra note 45, at 527
(arguing that the ESA is in harmony with treaty hunting and fishing rights and thus does
not abrogate those rights).
97. Martz Opinion, supra note 45, at 527. See also George C. Coggins & William
Modrcin, Native American Indians and Federal Wildlife Law, 31 STAN. L. Rnv. 375, 406
(1979) ("Mhe initial search should be for an interpretation that resolves the contradiction
by reconciling both policies if possible.").
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extinction.9
III. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973"
AND TRIBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A. Overview of the Statute
"[T]he Endangered Species Act of 1973 represent[s] the most
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever
enacted by any nation."'" To achieve its goals,'0 ' the ESA empow-
ers the Secretary of the Interior 2 to declare a species of wildlife
"endangered"'' 3 or "threatened"'" and to identify the "critical habi-
tat"'05 in which these species live."°
Because Congress believes that endangered or threatened species
should be afforded the "highest of priorities,"'0 7 it requires all federal
98. Martz Opinion, supra note 45, at 526-27.
99. Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
100. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
101. The ESA's stated goals are "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved [and] to
provide a program for the conservation of such ... species." ESA § 2(b), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531(b).
102. Pursuant to ESA § 3(15), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15), the term "Secretary" may also
mean the Secretary of Commerce, depending on the species and program responsibilities
as described in the Reorganization Plan Numbered 4 of 1970. See also ESA § 4(a)(2), 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2) (requiring the Secretary of Commerce to inform the Secretary of
Interior of endangered species).
103. The term "endangered species" is defined as: "any species which is in danger
of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range." ESA § 3(6), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(6).
104. Congress defined "threatened species" as: "any species which is likely to become
an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion
of its range." ESA § 3(20), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
105. Congress defined "critical habitat" as: "the specific areas within the geographical
area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed ... on which are found those physical
or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (11) which may
require special management considerations or protection." ESA § 3(5)(A)(i), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(5)(A)(i).
106. ESA § 4(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (determination of endangered and
threatened species); ESA § 4(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (designation of critical habitat).
107. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978). Congress found that
"these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
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agencies to use their authorities to promote the purposes of the stat-
ute.'O5 The ESA further requires each federal agency to ensure that
any action it authorizes, funds, or carries out will not jeopardize the
continued existence of any listed species. 1' 9 This ESA provision also
applies to the tribes when they act through the tribe's federal liaison, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)."0
Once the Secretary of the Interior lists a species as endangered,
ESA's section 9 makes it unlawful for any "person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States""' to import, export, take, possess,
sell, offer for sale, carry, transport, or ship any such species.1 2  The
statute broadly defines "take" as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or ... attempt to engage in any
such conduct."'  The definition does not distinguish between direct
and indirect takings." 4 The Department of the Interior has extended
the prohibition against taking endangered species to include threatened
species. "' Several species are covered by special rules which permit
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people." ESA § 2(a)(3), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531(a)(3).
108. ESA § 7(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). Under section 7, each agency is required
to carry out programs for the conservation of endangered and threatened species. Id.
109. ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Section 7(a)(2) also requires assurance
that no agency action shall "result in the destruction or adverse modification" of a
designated critical habitat. Id. A federal agency must consult with the Secretary of the
Interior (or the Secretary of Commerce) to prevent the likelihood of jeopardizing the
existence of these species. Id.
110. Telephone Interview with Steven Hoffman, supra note 28. The BIA provides the
tribes with a federal source of assistance and enables the tribes to avail themselves of
ESA's section 7 consultation provisions. These consultation provisions impose an obliga-
tion to consult, but also provide an easier route towards project approval, rather than the
more cumbersome section 10 incidental taking permit process. The average Native
American, however, is probably more interested in potential criminal prosecution for a
violation of section 9 of the Act. Id.
111. For a discussion of whether Indians are "persons" subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States for ESA purposes, see infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
112. ESA § 9(a)(1)(A)-(F), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A)-(F) (emphasis added). See also
ESA § 9(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2) (applying § 9 prohibitions to listed plant species).
113. ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
114. Id. See supra note 27.
115. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Dep't of the Interior, 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.31(a) (1995).
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takings under carefully defined circumstances." 6
Congress, however, did provide a few, narrow exceptions to section
9's prohibitions, which are set out in section 10."' First, the Secretary
of the Interior may issue a permit for taking a listed species if the taking
is incidental to an otherwise lawful activity."' Second, the "Alaska
natives" provision"' exempts Indians, Aleuts, or Eskimos who are
Alaskan natives residing in Alaska, and non-native permanent residents
of Alaskan native villages from the ESA's prohibition against taking a
listed species. 2 This narrow exemption is further limited by the
requirement that the taking occur primarily for subsistence purposes.'
At least one court has rejected an equal protection challenge alleging that
similarly-situated natives were unfairly excluded from the Alaskan native
exception.'22
Further exceptions to section 9's broad direct-takings prohibition
include permits for scientific purposes, and to enhance the propagation
or survival of the affected species.'23 In addition, the ESA permits
"hardship exemptions" for persons who enter into contracts with regards
to a species before it is published on the endangered list. 24 Several
tribes have attempted to escape the ESA's section 9 proscriptions by
arguing that because of their "aboriginal existence" and "long continuous
116. See, e.g., 50C.F.R. § 17.40(dX2)(i) (1995) (describing circumstances under which
gray wolves in Minnesota may be taken).
117. Johnson, supra note 21, at 182.
118. ESA § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(B). This exception additionally
requires that the permittee submit a conservation plan specifying mitigation measures and
funding mechanisms. ESA § 10(a)(2)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
119. ESA § 10(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e).
120. Id.
121. Id. The right to subsistence-purpose takings of listed species is not absolute; it
may be exercised only subject to such regulations as the Secretary may promulgate upon
a determination that "such taking[s] materially and negatively affecti the [listed] species."
ESA § 10(eX4), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(eX4).
122. United States v. Nuesca, 773 F. Supp. 1388, 1391 (D. Haw. 1990) (Nuesca 1).
The court did not see native Hawaiians and Alaskan natives as similarly situated because
the defendant failed to show that hunting green sea turtles was for subsistence purposes.
Id.
123. ESA § 10(aXl)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A).
124. ESA § 10(bX1), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(b)(1). See United States v. Species of
Wildlife, 404 F. Supp. 1298, 1299 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (rejecting the hardship exemption with
regard to a mounted leopard because the parties entered into the contract after the species
was listed as endangered).
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use of the area" they hold aboriginal rights to hunt and fish the species
present in that location."z This argument, however, has failed in light
of the federal government's ability to unilaterally extinguish any Indian
title based upon aboriginal possession.'26
B. The Impact of the Endangered Species Act
on Tribal Economic Development'27
The ESA prohibitions apply to tribal economic development in
direct-taking situations,' incidental-taking situations,'29 and in feder-
al agency actions. 3 The first type of section 9 violation may occur
when an Indian directly takes a listed species while hunting and
fishing.'3' Although a court is likely to address the motivation for the
125. See, e.g., Wahkiakum Band of Chinook Indians v. Bateman, 655 F.2d 176, 180
(9th Cir. 1981). A party may invoke this aboriginal rights defense if the party cannot
point to specific language in the treaty protecting a clear right to engage in the activity.
E.g., Nuesca 1, 773 F. Supp. at 1390-91 (rejecting the aboriginal rights defense). But see
Kristen Chapin, Indian Fishing Rights Activists in an Age of Controversy: The Case for
an Individual Aboriginal Rights Defense, 23 ENVTL. L. REv. 971, 976-81 (1993)
(discussing cases in which Indians have successfully asserted individual, as opposed to
tribal, aboriginal rights in the absence of treaties).
126. AlL DEsKBooK, supra note 14, at 211; Bateman, 655 F.2d at 180 ("Indian title
based on aboriginal possession ... may be extinguished by the federal government at any
time without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians."). See also
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955) ("[Indian title] means
mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by Congress."); United States
v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir.) (noting that when Congress "clearly intends
to extinguish Indian title the courts will not inquire into the means or propriety of the
action"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976).
127. I have relied on Baum, supra note 69, for much of the information in this section.
128. Baum, supra note 69, at 2-3. See also infra part IV (discussing direct takings
situations).
129. Baum, supra note 69, at 3. See also infra part III.C (discussing incidental taking
situations).
130. Baum, supra note 69, at 3. If a contemplated tribal action requires federal
approval, the approving agency may be required under ESA § 7(a)(2) to consult with the
Department of the Interior. Id. See also supra note 109 and accompanying text
(discussing the ESA's consultation requirement).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir.) (Dion 1) (considering
Indian defendants' right to hunt birds and sell their feathers under the Eagle Protection Act
and the Endangered Species Act), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 900 (1985), rev'd, 476 U.S. 734
(1986). See generally AlL DESKBOOK, supra note 14, at 251-53 (discussing the
application of the ESA to Indian treaty hunting and fishing rights).
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taking,'32 the motivation is not determinative because an ESA section
9 violation may occur notwithstanding the purpose for the taking.'33
The second type of section 9 violation may occur incidentally: a tribe
developing its reservation lands may cause, through its construction
activities, the death of a listed species or alter its habitat to the detriment
of the species.' The third type of section 9 violation may result when
a federal agency authorizes, funds, or grants its approval to a tribe on a
lease or other action. 3 In this scenario, the agency is required to
ensure that the tribal action will not affect the continued existence of the
species."'
The ESA is applicable to actions of the tribal government and
individual tribal members. The ESA section 9 prohibitions apply to any
person or entity "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."' 37
Indians are persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 3g
132. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 63 (1979) (holding that the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to regulate trade and
commercial sale of Indian artifacts made with feathers and other bird parts taken before
the Act was passed); Dion 1, 752 F.2d at 1270 (holding that Dion could only be convicted
upon ajury determination that the takings were for commercial purposes). But cf United
States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 664-65 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding that Chippewa sale
of items made of feathers from MBTA-protected birds does not violate the MBTA).
133. ESA § 9(a)(l), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (prohibiting takings without permission
of the secretary); ESA § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (defining "take" without reference
to motivation for the taking).
134. See City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The
relocation of a listed species or the alteration of its habitat during construction activities
constitutes an 'incidental taking' that is prohibited by the [ESA] unless the Secretary grants
a special permit.") (citing ESA § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)). The parties in City of Las
Vegas included the City, the State of Nevada, the Nevada Development Authority, and
private real estate developers. Id. at 929. No court to date has addressed the incidental
taking issue in the context of tribal activities.
135. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184-86 (1978) (holding that
under ESA § 7, federal agencies are required to safeguard endangered species and their
habitats, whether the federal project is in the planning or execution stages).
136. See id.
137. ESA § 9(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(I). See also ESA § 3(13), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(13) (defining "person").
138. Martz Opinion, supra note 45, at 527 (stating that "American Indians are clearly
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"). See United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp.
1485, 1491 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (finding congressional intent to extend ESA's prohibitions to
Indians). See also United States v. Nuesca, 773 F. Supp. 1388, 1391 (D. Haw. 1990)
(Nuesca 1), aff'd, 945 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nuesca fl). Nuesca, a native Hawaiian
charged with violating the ESA, argued that judicial principles governing the determination
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Because the ESA's section 9 applies to Indians, the "status" of Indian is
not a defense for a section 9 violation.
139
However, the presence or absence of a treaty right provides a
potential defense for violations of section 9. In United States v.
Billie, 40 after holding that Congress intended the ESA to apply to
Indians,' the district court considered whether the treaty with the
Seminole Tribe provided the defendant with a defense. 142  In United
States v. Nuesca (Nuesca /),143 the district court held that because there
was no treaty between the United States and native Hawaiians, the
defendant had no defense to a section 9 prosecution.' The court
decided this issue despite the defendant's contention that his ethnic status
bore comparison to that of Native Americans'45 or Native Alas-
kans. 4 6
of Indian rights should extend to Native Hawaiians. Nuesca 11, 945 F.2d at 256-57. The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, noting inter alla that no treaty governed the
relationship between Native Hawaiians and the federal government. Id.
139. Baum, supra note 69, at 3 (explaining further that "[b]ecause tribal governments
and tribal corporations are entities subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, they
should.., be considered 'persons' subject to ESA § 9").
140. 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
141. Id. at 1488 (noting that under ESA § 10(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e), Congress
exempted Alaskan natives from the ESA's prohibitions but it did not similarly exempt non-
Alaskan natives).
142. Id. at 1489-92. In Billie, a Seminole Indian was prosecuted for violating the
ESA. Billie shot and killed a Florida panther, an endangered species, on the Seminole
reservation. Id. at 1487. See also infra notes 227-42 and accompanying text (discussing
the Billie case).
143. 773 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Haw. 1990).
144. Id. at 1390. In Nuesca I, a native Hawaiian appealed his conviction under the
ESA for taking two green sea turtles off the northern shore of Maui. United States v.
Nuesca, 945 F.2d 254, 256 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nuesca 11). The green sea turtle is a "threat-
ened" species. 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(a) (1995).
145. Nuesca 1, 773 F. Supp. at 1391. Nuesca argued that, like Native Americans,
Native Hawaiians had aboriginal rights. Id. at 1390. Such rights could be abrogated
solely by the "clear and plain intent of Congress." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The
court, however, found the absence of a treaty addressing aboriginal right to be determina-
tive. Id.
146. Id. at 1391. Nuesca argued that Congress' failure to include native Hawaiians
in the ESA's exemption for native Alaskans was an equal protection violation. Id. The
court rejected this argument, noting that the native Alaskan exception applied to takings
for subsistence purposes, a circumstance which did not apply to native Hawaiians hunting
green sea turtles. Id.
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The direct conflict between Indian treaty rights, the ESA, and other
federal statutes protecting the environment presents a problem of
practical significance. Indians have cognizable interests in protecting the
economic security of their tribes'47 and in promoting economic devel-
opment and self-sufficiency.'4" As tribes seek to emerge from their
general state of underdevelopment,'49 they are frequently faced with a
problem: the wildlife on their reservations' or the fish in their
streams have become endangered, often through no fault of their
own.'15  Attempts by tribes and tribal members to improve their
147. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 337 (1983) (noting that
under an 1852 treaty, the Mescalero Apache Tribe had rights to regulate "the use of
resources by members as well as nonmembers"). See also Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980) (stating that the
"'power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or
its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty"). See also supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
148. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,216-17 (1987);
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334-35. See also 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (1994)
("Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency,
and strong tribal government .... ").
149. See generally Frank Pommersheim, Economic Development in Indian Country:
What are the Questions?, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 195, 196 (1984) (discussing the
difficulties of overcoming vast poverty on many Indian reservations and "examining the
context, goals, and strategies of development and the deeper concerns of culture and
meaning").
150. This problem can also occur off-reservation. For example, many of the
Northwestern treaties include a provision granting the Indians "the right of taking fish, at
all usual and accustomed grounds and stations ...." This language has been interpreted
to allow Indian fishing outside the boundaries of the tribe's ceded territory. COHEN, supra
note 2, at 455. See also United States ex rel. Williams v. Seufert Bros. Co., 233 F. 579,
583-84 (D. Or. 1916), affid sub nom. Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States ex rel.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nations, 249 U.S. 194 (1919).
These treaties, however, do not confer off-reservation fishing rights outside of these "usual
and accustomed grounds." COHEN, supra note 2, at 456. See also Seufert v. Olney, 193
F. 200, 203-04 (E.D. Wash. 1911).
151. For example, in an ongoing controversy regarding listed salmon in Oregon's
Columbia River, the Warm Springs, Umatilla, and Nez Perce Tribes argued against the
federal government's efforts to conserve the species by restricting tribal fishing. Plaintiff-
Intervenor Confederated Tribes' Joint Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Why Preliminary Injunctives Should Not
Enter at 1, United States v. Oregon, Civil No. 68-513 MA (brief on file with author). The
tribes argued that the government's goal of rescuing the listed fish from their "seemingly
inexorable decline toward extinction," id. at 17, demands action related to the federal
hydrosystem management rather than the Indian fisheries. Id. The tribes asserted:
Overall, tribal harvest is an insignificant factor in the decline of the listed Snake
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financial situation through commercial hunting or fishing, making crafts
and jewelry, or developing land can be greatly hindered by discovery of
listed species or a subsequent listing of a species known to live on their
land by the Secretary of the Interior.'52
C. The Impact of the Endangered Species Act on
Tribal Economic Development that Results in the
Incidental Taking of a Listed Species: A Hypothetical
The resulting query becomes: "Because the United States intended
through treaties that Native Americans become a 'civilized people,' do
tribes enjoy treaty rights to economically develop their reservations and,
in the process, incidentally take protected species thereon?"'5 Judicial
opinions on this issue may vary in much the same way as do prior
opinions dealing with the direct taking situation.' A court may
choose to focus on what the Indians understood their treaty rights to
mean,'55 the concentration of species in that area,'56 or the actual
River fall chinook. A pie chart display of human induced mortality for the 1994
Snake River fall chinook run shows the tribal fishery provided in the 1994 [Ocean
and In-River Agreement] is responsible for only 2.5% of total mortality....
[Computer] model runs show that if meaningful actions are taken in the areas with
the greatest mortality on the listed species, primarily hydrosystem operations, Snake
River fall chinook will stop their decline, stabilize and begin to rebuild. This
desirable outcome occurs with or without the tribal fishery.
Id. at 12 (citations omitted).
152. See City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also infra
part III.C (explaining the problems Indians could encounter when they try to develop their
land).
153. Baum, supra note 69, at 5 (quoting Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576
(1908)).
154. See infra part IV.
155. E.g., United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 662 (D. Minn. 1991)
(examining Chippewa beliefs that treaty rights to hunt migratory birds included the right
to sell their catch).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Nuesca, 945 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1991) (Nuesca 11).
The concentration of an endangered or threatened species in a given area and the demand
upon that particular species may be relevant to the level of protection the species receives
from the federal government. For example, in 1983, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) granted a subsistence authorization for the "handful of native Pacific Islanders
thousands of miles West of Hawaii," id., relying on the threatened green sea turtle for
subsistence purposes. In 1991, a native Hawaiian attempted to argue that a similar
subsistence exemption should be granted for indigenous Hawaiians. Id. The court rejected
his equal protection argument, noting that it was "reasonable" for NMFS to determine that
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number of the listed species remaining in the United States and its
territories. 7
The following hypothetical clarifies the narrow issue this Note
addresses and the contexts in which it may arise. 5 The Hoffinka tribe
lives on a reservation in the northeastern part of Arizona. The Hoffinka
reservation was established pursuant to the Treaty at Critter Point in
1849. Seeking to attract tourists and to make money on a growing trend
around the country, the Hoffinka tribe has decided to create the next
"Mirage" hotel complex on their reservation located on the outskirts of
a desert gambling metropolis. The Hoffinka tribe soon learns, however,
that the proposed development will be located in the prime habitat of a
listed species, the Desert-Bob-Snake. 9 The tribe further discovers that
its entire reservation is habitat for the reptile and, therefore, they cannot
relocate the development.
It is clear that the development will not only result in the incidental
taking of the Desert-Bob-Snakes, but will, due to its magnitude, actually
jeopardize the continued existence of the reptile. The Hoffinka tribe
asserts that the decline of the Desert-Bob-Snake is the result of previous
non-Indian development and that any limitation on their reservation's
economic development is an affront to their alleged treaty right-the
exclusive use and occupation of reservation lands. This Note addresses
the issue of whether the Hoffinka tribe violates ESA section 9160 if,
under the direction of Chief Hoffinka, it begins bulldozing the prospec-
tive development site and, in the process, it incidentally takes a protected
the Pacific Islanders subsisted off green sea turtles, while native Hawaiians did not. Id.
See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text (discussing Nuesca 1).
157. See United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1489-90 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (citing
Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973)); infra note 192. See also
Tina L. Morin, Note, Indians, Non-Indians, and the Endangered Panther; Will the
Indian/Non-Indian Conflict Be Resolved Before the Panther Disappears?, 13 PUB. LAND
L. REV. 167, 167 (1992) (noting that "[tioday, only twenty to fifty panthers remain in the
wild in southern Florida").
158. I would like to express my great appreciation to Steven Hoffman, an attorney in
the Solicitor's Office in the Department of the Interior, Division of Conservation and
Wildlife, for his help in creating this hypothetical.
159. For purposes of this hypothetical, assume that the Desert-Bob-Snake has been
officially classified as "endangered."
160. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
Washington University Open Scholarship
328 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 50:303
species.'
In considering whether Chief Hoffinka should be imprisoned and
heavily fined, this Note will consider the case law that has developed in
situations involving the direct taking of listed species; that is, the hunting
or fishing of species pursuant to reserved treaty rights. With this
background, this Note will apply the direct-taking analysis to the
hypothetical situation in which incidental taking of a listed species occurs
on tribal lands during the course of economic development.
IV. PREvious TREATMENT OF ESA-INDIAN TREATY CONFLICT
IN DIRECT TAKING SITUATIONS
The conflict between Indian treaty rights and the ESA commonly
involves the hunting and fishing of a listed species, 62 which may occur
both on and off the tribal reservation. 63 Absent a valid treaty or
statutory right reserving the Indians' right to hunt or fish a protected
species, the ESA's section 9 applies.' 6 As detailed in Part III.A, the
161. This hypothetical deliberately avoids any reference to federal agency involvement
to bypass the confusion that results when the provisions of ESA § 7 are triggered. See
supra notes 130 & 135 (discussing § 7). The § 7 argument is rather disingenuous because,
in the "real world," the "Mirage" hotel complex would probably be built with a non-Indian
developer's money in exchange for a ground lease. Under 25 U.S.C. § 415(a), such leases
require approval from the BIA, a division of the Department of the Interior. See generally
Reid P. Chambers & Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and
the Leasing ofindian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1061 (1974) (discussing the history of and
policies for leasing approval under § 415). Section 7(a)(2) requires the BIA, because it
is a federal agency, to "insure that any action authorized... by [the] agency.. . is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of [a listed species] or result in the destruction
or adverse modification of habitat of [a listed species]." ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2). Therefore, even if building a hotel complex is protected by a treaty right
that trumps the ESA, the BIA could not approve the project.
162. This is true regardless of whether the species is hunted or fished for commercial
or non-commercial purposes. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 150 (discussing federal treaties reserving the right for Indians to
hunt and fish off-reservation "at all usual and accustomed places").
164. United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that, in the
absence of an express exemption for Indians, federal laws of general application apply to
Indians on reservations, subject to three exceptions: "(1) the law touches upon 'exclusive
rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters'; (2) the application of the law to
the tribe would 'abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties'; or (3) there is proof 'by
legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to
Indians on their reservations'), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981); Donovan v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Farris, 624 F.2d at 893-
94). If there is no treaty right to hunt or fish the protected species at issue, no conflict
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statutorily-granted exceptions to the ESA's section 9 prohibitions are
rare165 and narrowly drawn. I" The only other means by which Na-
tive Americans can avoid section 9's proscriptions is by demonstrating
that their treaty rights have not been limited, modified, or abrogated.
In establishing reservations 67 the federal government may create
a treaty right to take an endangered or threatened species. 6 Such
taking rights may be expressly stated or created "by implication in the
setting aside of the lands as an Indian reservation.' ' 9  In analyzing
direct-taking situations, courts conduct very fact-specificjudicial inquiries
into the existence of the treaty right alleged to permit the taking.70
The extent to which these treaty rights have been limited, modified, or
abrogated by the ESA and similar legislation.' has evolved slowly
over the last twenty-three years.'72
with the ESA exists, and the statutes and treaty can be construed in harmony. Martz
Opinion, supra note 45, at 527-28. See also supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
165. The ESA's exemptions are laid out in § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539. See also supra
notes 117-26 and accompanying text for a more thorough examination of the ESA's
exemptions.
166. See United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (S.D. Fla. 1987) ("Congress
has drawn several extraordinarily narrow exceptions to the [ESA's] prohibitions.").
167. Reservations were established either by treaty or executive order. See supra note
42.
168. Baum, supra note 69, at 4 (citing United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485,
1488-89 (S.D. Fla. 1987)).
169. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1488.
170. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745 (1986) (Dion III) (concluding that
Congress abrogated the treaty right to take bald eagles for commercial and non-commercial
purposes); United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding that treaty
hunting rights did not include the right to sell eagles commercially). But cf. United States
v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 660-62 (D. Minn. 1991) (finding a treaty right to sell items
containing feathers from birds protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
171. Courts have also addressed the conflict of tribal rights with federal conservation
efforts under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994), and the Eagle
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1994).
172. The conflict between Indian treaty rights and federal or state conservation statutes
dates back to 1905 when the Supreme Court first suggested, in dicta, that Indian treaty
fishing rights could be subjected to state regulation when necessary for the conservation
of fish. COHEN, supra note 2, at 459 (citing Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684
(1942) and United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1905)). An analysis of several
non-ESA direct-taking cases (i.e., hunting and fishing) is necessary to more fully develop
the incidental taking hypothetical presented in part III.C, supra.
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While just two cases' have considered the relationship of the
ESA to the exercise of Native American treaty rights to hunt and
fish, 74 it is important to comprehend the courts' analyses. In examin-
ing the ESA-treaty rights conflict, courts look to past decisions dealing
with similar conflicts involving state and federal conservation statutes.
A future court's analysis of an incidental taking claim may borrow from
the principles developed in these lines of cases.
A. Limitation and Modification of Indian Treaty Rights
The question of when and under what circumstances a treaty right
to directly take a species may be limited or modified has been addressed
by several courts in the past. In a case involving the Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians, the Seventh Circuit twice addressed the question of
whether the Chippewas retained their usufructuary rights to hunt and fish
reserved to them by treaties in 1837 and 1842."Ts In Lac Courte
Oreilles Band v. Voigt (Lac Courte ),176 the court held that although
these usufructuary rights survived a subsequent treaty in 1854,'" the
rights "might be subject to some conservation regulations."'78 In Lac
Courte Oreiles Band v. Wisconsin (Lac Courte I), the court noted that
it had grave doubts that "extinction of a species or even wholesale
slaughter... is a reasonable adjunct to the [treaty] rights reserved by the
Indians."'17
173. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (Dion III); United States v. Billie,
667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987). See supra note 25 for a sampling of relevant law
review articles on this issue.
174. The ESA views Indian hunting and fishing as direct takings because the wildlife
at issue is killed as the direct result of the Indian activity. By contrast, incidental takings,
as demonstrated in the hypothetical, occur when wildlife is threatened or killed as a result
of building something like the "Mirage" hotel complex or other such lawful activities. For
example, an incidental taking could occur if a listed species such as the Desert-Bob-Snake,
or its critical habitat, got in the way of a bulldozer.
175. Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 351-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Besadny v. Lac Courte Oreilles Band, 464 U.S. 805 (1983) (Lac Courte 1); Lac
Courte Oreilles Band v. Wisconsin, 760 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1985) (Lac Courte 11).
176. 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983). Also at issue were the tribe's usufructuary rights
to trap, and to gather wild rice and maple sap on non-reservation lands. Id. at 351.
177. Id. at 365.
178. Lac Courte II, 760 F.2d at 183 (making clear "that to which [the Court] adverted
only by implication" in Lac Courte 1).
179. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/11
THE EFFECT OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The Department of the Interior concurs with this reasoning.' In
an opinion discussing the application of the ESA to Native Americans
with treaty hunting and fishing rights, the Solicitor of the Interior
Department, Clyde Martz, declared that, "as a matter of law, Indian
treaty rights do not include the right to take species which are endan-
gered or threatened with extinction.'' Thus, even if a treaty right to
take a protected species exists,' that right may be limited or modified
by the need to conserve the species.'83
The Supreme Court further refined the government's ability to limit
and modify existing Indian treaty rights in the Puyallup trilogy. 4  At
issue in the Puyallup cases was a dispute over rights to the run of
steelhead trout on the Puyallup River in the state of Washington.'85
The Indians alleged that Washington's fishing regulations infringed upon
their treaty right to fish.'" The regulations, while permitting hook and
line fishing, banned net fishing as a conservation measure.8 7 In
securing the rights of the Puyallup to take a portion of the steelhead trout
180. See generally Martz Opinion, supra note 45, at 529.
181. Id.
182. See infra notes 258-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of what it means
to have a treaty right to take a listed species and whether that right is qualified in the
incidental taking context.
183. Baum, supra note 69, at 6.
184. See Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968)
(Puyallup 1); Department of Game of Washington v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973)
(Puyallup I1); and Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165
(1977) (Puyallup 111).
185. Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. at 395.
186. Id. at 396. The Puyallup pointed to the Treaty of Medicine Creek, which protects
their right to engage in commercial net fishing. See id. at 398. The tribe alleged that the
ban on net fishing prevented Indians from fishing while permitting sport fishing. Puyallup
11, 414 U.S. at 46-47.
187. Puyallup 11, 414 U.S. at 45 (citing Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. at 400). Because the
tribe relied on net fishing, while sport fishermen used hook-and-line fishing, the tribe
alleged the regulation was discriminatory. Id. at 46-47. The State of Washington
prohibited "all Indian net fishing of steelhead trout because those who engaged in sport
fishing, with hook and line, caught all the steelhead that could be taken under conservation
measures." PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 403-04 (discussing Puyallup 11). The Puyallup,
however, argued that it was unfair for the state to force them to bear the entire burden of
steelhead trout conservation because they were only responsible for about half of the
steelhead trout take. Puyallup II, 414 U.S. at 46-47.
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run,' the Court held that valid treaty rights to take wildlife may be
limited "in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets
appropriate standards.. 9 and does not discriminate against the Indi-
ans."'1 While the Puyallup cases focused on the state's power to
regulate treaty hunting and fishing rights in the interest of conservation,




Although federal regulations may limit or modify Indian treaty
rights, the standard the federal government has to meet for a court to
uphold the regulation is not yet settled. 2  Some courts apply a
188. The Supreme Court, in Puyallup lll, vacated the Supreme Court of Washington's
decision that permitted the state to regulate the tribe's on-reservation fishing activities.
Puyallup I1, 433 U.S. at 167 n.1, 178. The Court upheld the state's regulatory authority,
when such regulations were reasonable and necessary for the conservation of fish.
PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 404.
Judge George Boldt, however, expanded the Indians' right in United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), when he defined the precise meaning
of the treaty phrases "the right of taking fish" and "in common with all citizens of the
Territory." PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 404. His controversial decision allotted the Puyallup
not only access to the fishing sites, but a maximum 50% share of the fish, exclusive of
religious and subsistence take. Id. at 405. This victory for the tribe was met by
widespread dismay amongst non-Indians. Id.
189. Under the "appropriate standards" rule, the state's regulation must be "a
reasonable and necessary conservation measure and that its application to the Indians is
necessary in the interest of conservation." Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207
(1975) (citations omitted).
190. Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. at 398. The Department of Game of Washington was
required to achieve an accommodation between the Puyallups' net fishing rights and
conservation needs. Puyallup I, 414 U.S. at 48. At the conclusion of his majority
opinion in Puyallup 11, Justice Douglas stated:
We do not imply that these fishing rights persist down to the very last steelhead
in the river. Rights can be controlled by the need to conserve a species; and the
time may come when the life of a steelhead is so precarious in a particular stream
that all fishing should be banned until the species regains assurance of survival. The
police power of the State is adequate to prevent the steelhead from following the fate
of the passenger pigeon; and the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to
pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets.
id. at 49.
191. Baum, supra note 69, at 6-7 (citing, as cases which have extended the holdings
of the Puyallup trilogy to federal regulation, United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354,
1362 (9th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 1980)).
192. Id. at 7 n.6.
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conservation standard'93 while others examine the process by which the
government promulgated the regulations." The ESA should survive
either the conservation or the rule-making test. The ESA strives to
prevent the extinction of a species and "to avoid further diminution of
national and worldwide wildlife resources" through all necessary
resources and efforts.'95 It is possible to argue that under the Puyallup
decisions, tribal hunting and fishing treaty rights are limited by the
substantive provisions of the ESA.'6 The ESA's measures are non-
discriminatory and reasonable and necessary for the preservation of
threatened and endangered species.'97
193. Id. Courts apply conservation standards of varying degrees of rigor. In United
States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658, 664 (D. Minn. 1991), the court found that, as a result
of the Puyallup trilogy, federal regulations of treaty rights must be non-discriminatory
measures intended to prevent extinction of a species. Id. By contrast, in Northern
Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741, 750 (10th Cir. 1987), the court held that the
government had authority to regulate tribal behavior when exercise of a treaty right
"endangers the resource and threatens to divest [another tribe] of their right." Id.
194. United States v. Eberhardt, 789 F.2d 1354, 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (examining the
standards of the Administrative Procedures Act). The Eberhardt court rejected the
"endangered species approach to conservation" and held that federal regulatory limitations
may be properly imposed so long as the Interior Department properly exercised its rule
making authority. Id. The court may set aside the Indian regulation only if it is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." Id. The
Ninth Circuit had previously rejected the endangered species approach in favor of
permitting state regulation to preserve a "reasonable margin of safety." United States v.
Oregon, 718 F.2d 299, 305 (9th Cir. 1983).
195. George C. Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D. L. REv. 315, 321 (1974).
196. This argument has been made by the Department of the Interior. See Martz
Opinion, supra note 45, at 529; Baum, supra note 69, at 7.
197. Martz Opinion, supra note 45, at 529; Baum, supra note 69, at 7. Baum
continues, quoting United States v. Billie:
Indian rights to hunt and fish are not absolute. Where conservation measures are
necessary to protect endangered wildlife, the Government can intervene on behalf of
other federal interests.... [I]ndians, the states, and the federal Government [have]
a common interest in the preservation of the species. Where the actions of one group
can frustrate the others' efforts at conservation, reasonable, nondiscriminatory
measure [sic] may be required to ensure the species' continued existence.
The Endangered Species Act is such a measure.
667 F. Supp. 1485, 1490 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (quoted in Baum, supra note 69, at 7-8) (citation
omitted).
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B. Abrogation of Indian Treaty Rights
Another controversial question concerning Indian treaty rights and
federal conservation statutes is when a treaty right to take a protected
species is completely abrogated."' The general rule, which has been
endorsed by case law,' 99 the Department of the Interior,"o and the
leading authority on Indian Law, Felix Cohen,2"' is that a federal law
of general application applies with equal force to Indians on reserva-
tions. 20 2  Courts must determine whether congressional intent to
abrogate the Indians' treaty rights is clear from the face of the statute, its
legislative history, or the surrounding circumstances. 203
It was not until 1986, in United States v. Dion (Dion 111),201 that
the Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue of treaty abrogation in
the context of the ESA. 205  A jury convicted Dwight Dion, Sr., a
member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe, of, inter alia, the shootings of four
bald eagles, in violation of the ESA.206 Dion was caught as a result of
a "sting" operation run by undercover United States Fish and Wildlife
agents posing as collectors and traders of Indian crafts and artifacts.27
198. See generally Laurence, The Abrogation ofindian Treaties, supra note 25, at 860
(examining whether Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish should be cast aside when the
federal government promulgates a new conservation statute without expressly mentioning
the Indians or their treaties).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 449
U.S. 1111 (1981).
200. See Applicability of the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967 on Indian Reservations,
78 Interior Dec. 18 (1971).
201. COHEN, supra note 2, at 297.
202. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960);
Farris, 624 F.2d at 893.
203. See supra text accompanying note 89.
204. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
205. Miller, supra note 20, at 565.
206. Dion 11I, 476 U.S. at 735. Dion was additionally charged and convicted of
selling the carcasses and parts of the eagles and other protected birds in violation of the
Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Id. Before the trial, the district
court dismissed a charge of shooting a golden eagle in violation of the Eagle Protection
Act. Id.
207. United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1985) (Dion 11). The
undercover operation, code-named "Operation Eagle," was inspired by reports that "an
excess number of birds were being picked up around the Yankton Sioux Reservation." Id.
(internal quotations omitted). While investigating the possible violations of federal wildlife
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The agents visited the Yankton Sioux Reservation on several occasions
over a two-year period and paid Dion and others for birds' carcasses and
other body parts.' The Eighth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed in
part and affirmed in part.' The court reversed the convictions on
several charges brought under the ESA and the Eagle Protection Act,
holding that neither statute abrogated Dion's treaty right to hunt non-
commercially on his reservation. t However, the court affirmed the
convictions based on Dion's commercial dealings in protected birds
because the court found that Dion had no treaty right to sell the birds'
carcasses or body parts.2 '
In Dion 111,2 the Supreme Court faced a formidable issue:
laws, the agent learned "that Indian crafts made with protected bird parts were arriving
from South Dakota for sale in New Mexico." Id
208. Dion II, 476 U.S. at 735. The Court noted that during this period, the
reservation experienced depressed economic conditions and the agents offered large
amounts of money to induce the defendants to kill the eagles. Dion II, 762 F.2d at 686.
Two of the original four defendants escaped convictions under the defense of entrapment.
See id. at 682-92.
209. United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985) (Dion 1).
210. Id. The Eighth Circuit examined the legislative history and surrounding
circumstances of the ESA and the Eagle Protection Act and concluded that neither statute
contained the requisite clear and plain intent necessary to abrogate a treaty. Id. at 1269-70.
The court held that the tribes' treaty rights to take bald and golden eagles for non-commer-
cial purposes remained intact. Id.
The Eighth Circuit cited its prior ruling in United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th
Cir. 1974). In White, the court held that in order to affect treaty hunting rights, Congress
must expressly abrogate or modify the spirit of the relationship between the United States
and the Indians. Id. at 457-58. The Eighth Circuit decided that this had not been done
to its satisfaction in either White, or Dion . Dion 1, 752 F.2d at 1263.
211. Dion 1, 752 F.2d at 1264-65, 1270. The court relied upon United States v. Top
Sky, 547 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976). In Top Sky, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
commercial sale of eagles and eagle parts violated the ESA. Id. at 487-88. The Ninth
Circuit examined historical evidence, tribal custom, and religious practice and held that no
treaty right to engage in these commercial activities existed. Id. at 487-89.
In Dion I, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the reasoning in Top Sky, noting that Dion had
presented no historical evidence of a Yankton Sioux practice that involved the commercial
sale of eagle or scissor-tailed flycatcher carcasses. Dion I, 752 F.2d at 1264-65.
Similarly, the record in Dion I clearly acknowledged that the Yankton Sioux Tribe
condemned the selling of eagle parts as a matter of tribal custom and religion. Id. For
these reasons, the Eighth Circuit found that, because the Yankton Sioux could not
reasonably have understood their treaty as reserving in them the right to engage in the
commercial sale of eagles or other protected birds, no treaty right to do so existed. Id.
212. 476 U.S. 734 (1986). The Government appealed the Eighth Circuit's ruling,
arguing that Dion's convictions should have been affirmed, regardless of whether the
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whether the ESA213 and the Eagle Protection Act abrogated the rights
of members of the Yankton Sioux Tribe under an 1858 treaty to hunt the
bald or golden eagle on the Yankton Sioux Reservation." 4 The Court
reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that the Eagle Protection Act
abrogated Indians' treaty rights to hunt bald and golden eagles.215 As
a result, Dion had no treaty rights on which he could rely as a de-
fense.2" 6 The Court, however, refused to consider whether Congress
abrogated the tribes' treaty rights to hunt eagles under the ESA.217
In Dion IXI, the Court reviewed the varying standards for determin-
ing whether Congress has abrogated treaty rights.238 First, the Court
reiterated its preference that Congress expressly indicate its intention to
abrogate treaty rights23 9 through "explicit statutory language. 2
Second, in promulgating the actual consideration and choice test,22' the
Court sought to guide Congress by explaining how "such a clear and
killings were done for commercial or non-commercial purposes. Id. at 736 n.3.
213. See Miller, supra note 20, at 567 ("[The Court did not dispute Dion's assertion
that [the ESA] and its legislative history... are to a great extent silent regarding Indian
hunting rights.") (internal quotations omitted).
214. Dion III, 476 U.S. at 736-37. The 1858 treaty did not limit the tribe's right to
hunt on their reservation. Id.
215. Id. at 745 (finding that the 1962 amendments to the Eagle Protection Act
"reflected an unmistakable and explicit legislative policy choice that Indian hunting [of
eagles] ... is inconsistent with the need to preserve [them]").
216. Id.
217. Id. at 746. See also Baum, supra note 69, at 9. The Court reasoned that
Congress had divested Dion of his treaty right to hunt eagles when it passed and amended
the Eagle Protection Act. Dion 111, 476 U.S. at 745. Thus, the Court denied Dion the
opportunity to allege the treaty defense for the ESA charges. Id.
218. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the
Supreme Court's treaty abrogation analysis in Dion III and the promulgation of the actual
consideration and choice test. See also Baum, supra note 69, at 8-9; Miller, supra note
20, at 566.
219. Dion III, 476 U.S. at 739. The Court does not "rigidly interpret[ ] that
preference, however, as a per se nile." Id.
220. See id. (explaining that "[a]bsent explicit statutory language, [the Supreme Court
has] been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights") (quoting
Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
690 (1979)).
221. For further discussion of the actual consideration and choice test see Laurence,
The Abrogation of Indian Treaties, supra note 25, at 862-85; Johnson, supra note 21, at
181. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91 for the precise wording of the actual
consideration and choice test.
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plain intent must be demonstrated." 222  Third, in applying this test the
Court found "unmistakable and explicit" evidence in the Eagle
Protection Act's legislative history that Congress had actually considered
the conflict between the Acts' intended purpose and tribal treaty
rights224 and chose to resolve the conflict in favor of the conservation
measure. 225  The Supreme Court concluded that Congress' actions
reflected its policy judgment that "Indian hunting of the bald or golden
eagle, except pursuant to a permit, is inconsistent with the need to
preserve those species. "
The only post-Dion case to consider the conflict between the ESA
and Indian treaty rights is United States v. Billie.227 In Billie, the
district court tackled the issue left undecided by the Supreme Court in
Dion: whether the ESA abrogates Indian treaty hunting rights. 228 The
Billie court noted that, despite the Eighth Circuit's en banc opinion in
Dion I which held that the ESA was inapplicable "to Indians exercising
non-commercial hunting rights on Indian land, 229 this question was
one of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit."0
The State of Florida charged James E. Billie, a member and
222. Dion II, 476 U.S. at 738-40. It is necessary that the evidence establishes that
Congress "actually considered the conflict between its intended action ... and Indian
treaty rights." Id. at 73940.
223. Id. at 745.
224. Id. at 740-45.
225. Miller, supra note 20, at 566. Miller states:
Government officials had asked Congress to consider an exemption for the taking of
eagles for Indian cultural and religious purposes. In response, Congress enacted a
provision that allowed the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits for tribal
members to take eagles for those purposes. The Court held that this legislative
history clearly evidenced that Congress considered and chose to abrogate treaty
hunting rights.
Id. at 566-67 (footnotes omitted).
226. Dion I1, 476 U.S. at 745.
227. 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987). Chief Billie was also prosecuted in a Florida
state proceeding. See Florida v. Billie, 497 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(reversing tribal court's dismissal of criminal charge). See also Miller, supra note 20, at
586.
228. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1487. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
229. Id. at 1487-88 (citing United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985)
(Dion 1)).
230. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1488.
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Chairman of the Seminole Indian Tribe, for killing a Florida panther in
violation of the ESA."3 Billie argued that he was properly exercising
his treaty rights because the kill was made for religious and medicinal
purposes, and moreover, it occurred on his reservation, the Big Cypress
Seminole Indian Reservation. 2 The district court held that the rights
of Indians to hunt and fish are not absolute." a The court elaborated,
stating that "[w]here conservation measures are necessary to protect
endangered wildlife, the Government can intervene ... [with] reasonable,
nondiscriminatory measure[s]." 4
The Billie court found the ESA to be such a reasonable and
nondiscriminatory measure.3 5  To support its conclusion, the court
applied the actual consideration and choice test. 3 6 It concluded that
Congress considered the Indians' interest from the Act's general
comprehensiveness and the Act's legislative history. 7  The court
discussed the significance of the Alaskan Native exemption 8 to taking
prohibitions. 9 The court further noted that the House and Senate
231. Id. at 1487. The Florida panther, or fells concolor coryi, is a subspecies of the
panther which has been listed as "endangered" since 1967. Id. at 1487-88. See also 50
C.F.R. § 17.11 (1995). The panther's historic range is listed as extending from Louisiana
and Arizona east to South Carolina and Florida. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1488. The species
now, however, appears to be confined to South Florida. Id. at 1496.
232. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1487, 1494-97. See also Morin, supra note 157, at 169.
233. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1490.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. The Billie court summarized its findings:
The legislative history must be considered along with the plain language of the
Act. The narrow Alaskan exception, the inclusion of Indians within the Act's
definition of "person," the Act's general comprehensiveness, and the evidence that
the House committee desired to prohibit Indians from hunting and fishing protected
species all provide "clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict
between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and
chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating" the Indian rights.
Id. at 1491-92 (quoting United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (Dion 111)).
237. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1490. "[The Act's] general comprehensiveness, its
nonexclusion of Indians, and the limited exceptions for certain Alaskan natives," is
evidence that Congress examined and considered Indian interests. Id.
238. ESA § 10(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e). See supra text accompanying note 117.
239. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1490-92.
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committees debated and rejected broader versions of the exemption.24°
Thus, the Billie court concluded that Congress had considered the Indian
rights but chose not to accommodate them.24' In holding that the ESA
abrogated the Seminoles' treaty hunting rights, the court concluded that
Congress "could not have intended that the Indians would have the
unfettered right to kill the last handful of Florida panthers. 242
Although litigants and legal scholars have addressed the highly
controversial relationship between the ESA and Indian treaty rights to
hunt and fish, it remains to be seen how these cases will apply to the
incidental taking situation.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT ON TRIBAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAT RESULTS IN THE "INCIDENTAL
TAKING" OF A LISTED SPECIES: AN ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
In the hunting and fishing cases, there was a direct conflict between
a specific treaty right and federal and state conservation statutes such as
the ESA.243 For example, Chief Billie's historic right to kill Florida
panthers for Seminole religious and cultural practices2" was established
240. Id. at 1490-91. One rejected version exempted "consumption and ritual use by
American Indians, Aleuts or Eskimos." Id. at 1490 (internal quotations omitted). The
court concluded that "[C]ongress must have known that the limited Alaskan exemption
would be interpreted to show congressional intent not to exempt other Indians." Id. at
1491.
241. Id. at 1490-91. For a critical analysis of the Billie courts' findings on
congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty hunting and fishing rights, see Miller, supra
note 20, at 568-71.
242. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1492.
243. Because this section of the Note considers the relationship between the ESA and
incidental takings of a species listed pursuant to the ESA's provisions, other federal or
state conservation statutes will not be similarly analyzed.
244. The Billie court explained the religious and cultural significance of the Florida
panther for the Seminole Indians:
According to Seminole tradition, the panther was the first choice of the creator to
enter the earth .... Buffalo Jim, a Seminole medicine man, testified that panther
claws are good for cramps and different ailments. Jim Shore, general counsel to the
Seminole tribal council, testified that panther parts are an important part of a
medicine man's bundle. It is commonly known that panther claws and tails are used
for different ailments, and a medicine man should have them on hand in case they
are needed to minister to a particular illness ... [such as] muscle cramps, which
cannot be treated as well without the panther part.
Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1496-97.
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implicitly in Executive Order No. 1379 in 1911 24s Fifty-five years
later, however, the Florida panther became one of the first species of
wildlife protected under the 1966 Endangered Species Preservation
Act, 46 the predecessor to the ESA.247 This created a direct conflict
between the two interests, ultimately resulting in the prosecution of Chief
Billie.248
In an incidental taking situation, 49 however, there may not be
such a conflict. For example, in the hypothetical 20 Chief Hoffinka
wants to help his tribe rise above the near poverty level at which they,
like many other tribes, presently exist.2"' To do so, Chief Hoffinka
plans to develop the Hoffinka reservation and build the "Mirage" hotel
complex. He believes he has the right to do so, because under the Treaty
at Critter Point the reservation lands were devoted to the Tribes'
"exclusive use and benefit. '' 2  When confronted with information
indicating that the "Mirage" project will lead to the imminent demise of
the endangered Desert-Bob-Snake, Chief Hoffinka contends that this is
not an Indian problem. He cites valid scientific studies proving that the
decline of the Desert-Bob-Snake is largely the result of previous non-
Indian development. In a heated moment between the Chief and a
United States Fish and Wildlife Service agent, Chief Hoffinka states that,
as far as the Hoffinka and their reservation are concerned, the ESA does
not apply, and they will begin bulldozing in a few weeks.
However, the Hoffinka Tribe seems to have forgotten the lesson
taught by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Farris." In Farris,
members of the Puyallup Indian Tribe in Washington appealed their
245. Id. at 1488.
246. Id. at 1495 (citing the 1966 Endangered Species Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 89-
669, 80 Stat. 926). The Florida panther was listed as "threatened with extinction." Id.
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 227-42 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion of the
Billie case.
249. See supra note 174 (examining the difference between direct and incidental
takings).
250. See supra part III.C.
251. See Pommersheim, supra note 149, at 195 (discussing the severe levels of poverty
that exist in Indian country across the nation).
252. This language is common in Indian treaties. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1989).
253. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981).
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convictions under a federal statute prohibiting illegal gambling.2 4 The
appellants argued that the statute did not apply to them or their large-
scale gambling activities.2" The circuit court rejected this argument,
stating that "federal laws generally applicable throughout the United
States apply with equal force to Indians on reservations. 256 The Ninth
Circuit, however, analyzed the appellants' possible claims under the
several exceptions to this blanket rule.2"7
The court examined the presumption that, in passing general
legislation, Congress does not intend an abrogation of treaty rights unless
it specifically names Indians. 8 The Farris court noted this exception
"applies only to subjects specifically covered in treaties, such as hunting
rights; usually, general federal laws apply to Indians." '259 Therefore,
the court maintained that the treaty must contain specific language
permitting on-reservation gambling to avoid the federal prohibition on
gambling." Because the court did not find such language in the
treaty, it held that there was not a conflict between the federal statute
prohibiting gambling and the United States-Puyallup Treaty. Thus, the
federal statute automatically applied to the tribe.26" '
Generic development of reservation land is not a treaty-protected
activity which would preclude the application of a federal law of general
254. Id. at 892. The statute at issue in Farris was 18 U.S.C. § 1955. Id. Congress
enacted § 1955 as part of the Organized Crime Control Act in an effort to "curtailfl
syndicated gambling, the lifeline of organized crime, which provides billions of dollars
each year to oil its diversified machinery." Id. (citing United States v. Sacco, 491 F.2d
995, 998 (9th Cir. 1974)).
255. Farris, 624 F.2d at 893.
256. Id
257. Id. at 893-94.
258. Id. at 893 (citing Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975)); Menominee
Tribe v. Unites States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th
Cir. 1974)).
259. Farris, 624 F.2d at 893.
260. Id.
261. See id. The treaty in question is the 1854 Treaty of Medicine Creek. Id. See
also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 736 n.2 (1986) (Dion III) (noting that Dion
chose not to challenge his convictions for hunting and selling bald eagles for commercial
purposes because the rights to do so were not included in the Yankton Sioux treaty with
the federal Government); United States v. Nuesca, 773 F. Supp. 1388, 1390 (D. Haw.
1990) (Nuesca 1) (holding that "[a]bsent an explicit treaty or statutory right to take green
sea turtles, [the defendant] can point to no legally recognized 'aboriginal right' to take
green sea turtles").
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applicability such as the ESA. The treaty language granting tribal lands
to the Hoffinka's exclusive use is insufficient to affect the operation of
a law of general applicability: the treaty must contain specific language
allowing on-reservation construction of a hotel complex or something
similar.262 Without this specific language, the Chief and his fellow
Hoffinka will be unable to avoid the strictures of the ESA.263 The tribe
will be compelled to apply for an ESA section 10 permit to proceed with
construction.2 4
Suppose, however, that the Treaty at Critter Point contains a
provision guaranteeing the Hoffinka the right to the economic returns
from their land. In this case, a court's analysis of the ESA-treaty conflict
would shift away from the straight forward Farris approach. A court
would have to resolve whether the treaty right to economic returns
equates with a treaty right to engage in economic activity on lands
inhabited by a listed species.
The central question would become whether the Hoffinkas' rights
under the Treaty at Critter Point bar the application of the ESA. The
Indians have a strong interest in pursuing their tribal economic develop-
ment plans. The Hoffinka may perceive any concurrent federal
jurisdiction as an impairment of their independent tribal control.265
When a tribe has a treaty right to the economic return from land
inhabited by a protected species, the federal government can invoke its
trust responsibilities." The Department of the Interior has determined
262. See Farris, 624 F.2d at 893.
263. Id.
264. ESA § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) ("The Secretary may permit...
any taking otherwise prohibited ... if such taking is incidental . . . ."). If the ESA is
applicable to the Hoffinka, its provisions will govern any activity conducted upon their
reservation. See id. Because the Desert-Bob-Snake has been declared endangered, and
because the Hoffinka Reservation is the species' critical habitat, the Hoffinka will have to
fully comply with ESA's § 10 permit requirements or risk a § 9 violation.
265. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 338 (1983). In
Mescalero, the Supreme Court stated that "concurrent jurisdiction would effectively nullify
the Tribe's authority to control hunting and fishing on the reservation," id. at 338, and
would "threaten Congress' overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-government and
economic development." Id. at 341. However, Mescalero does not control the situation
at hand because it addressed only concurrent state, not federal, jurisdiction.
266. "An agency's trust responsibilities are established and defined by treaties, statutes,
regulations and executive orders." Baum, supra note 69, at 13 (citing United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611-
12 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text (discussing the trust
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that its trust responsibility "to preserve Indian wildlife resources for
future generations of Indians," '267 both authorizes and requires the
conservation of listed species.2 Thus, the government can limit or
prevent the Indians from taking a species in the interest of protecting a
trust resource.269
In our hypothetical, the Department of the Interior might reasonably
conclude that the Hoffinka are risking extinction of the Desert-Bob-
Snake. By refusing to cooperate with the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service and clinging to a treaty right to economic return on
land, the Hoffinkas' desire to profit from the gambling resort may
warrant governmental interference in order to protect the Desert-Bob-
Snake for future generations of Hoffinka.27 °
Abrogation analysis would also apply to the hypothetical. The
ESA is not expressly applicable to the Hoffinka tribe, or any Indian tribe
for that matter. Thus, the ESA may not be invoked against the Hoffinka
if the facts given in the hypothetical fall within the treaty rights
exception." In contrast to express treaty hunting and fishing rights,
there may not be a treaty right to build the hotel complex and, thus, there
is no conflict between the treaty and the ESA. 2 Because the ESA is
a law of general applicability, it applies automatically to the Hoffinka
relationship).
267. Martz Opinion, supra note 45, at 530.
268. The Martz Opinion states:
The special responsibility of the Secretary to Indians compels regulation of Indian
hunting and fishing pursuant to a treaty. This responsibility obligates the United
States to take all reasonable and necessary steps to protect the hunting and fishing
rights offuture tribal members from being squandered by the "untrammeled" pursuit
of endangered species by present tribal members. Failure to act could be deemed a
dereliction of the Secretary's special responsibilities since a treaty hunting or fishing
right loses all realistic value if the game species upon which it is focused is allowed
to suffer the fate of the passenger pigeon.
Id. (citations omitted).
269. See id.
270. Baum, supra note 69, at 14 n.9.
271. See United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that the
rule that Congress is not presumed to abrogate Indian treaty rights when passing general
legislation applies only to specifically granted rights). See supra notes 253-61 and
accompanying text (discussing Farris).
272. See Farris, 624 F.2d at 893.
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tribe.273
If, however, there is a specific treaty right to build the hotel or to
receive economic return from the land, and this results in an incidental
taking of a listed species, courts will have to apply the Dion-Billie direct
takings analysis. The courts, however, must remember that the ESA's
section 10 may permit an incidental taking of listed species by non-
Indians.274 It hardly seems rational that the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service must first deny all non-Indians the permission to
incidentally take the listed species before a Chief Hoffinka can be
stopped from eliminating all of them because of the tribes' treaty
right.275
Therefore, the ESA should not only abrogate the treaty right to hunt
and fish listed species, but it should also abrogate any treaty right that
results in an incidental taking.276 Thus, under the ESA, an incidental
taking of a protected species would be prohibited by section 9 to the
same extent that a direct taking is. 277  Although this prohibition on
incidental takings may limit the treaty rights of Indians to develop their
land, it is a reasonable and necessary conservation measure.2 78
VI. CONCLUSION
The extent to which the Endangered Species Act takings prohibition
limits economic development in Indian country is a new and relatively
uncharted area of law. Although the conflict between treaty rights and
federal conservation statutes has arisen in the past in the direct takings
context, only recently has the issue of the indirect taking of an endan-
273. See supra text accompanying note 256.
274. See supra note 27 (discussing ESA § 10's permit process for incidental takings).
275. See, e.g., United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987). In Billie,
the court had to wrestle with two competing factors: (I) The Seminoles of South Florida
believe in the magical healing powers of the Florida panther; and (2) the last 20 to 50
Florida panthers are located in South Florida. Id. at 1494-96. Given this situation, if the
Seminoles had untrammeled rights to take an otherwise protected species, the Florida
panther might be extinct by now. However, the district court found that the ESA
abrogated the Indians' rights to engage in this conduct. Id. at 1492. Similarly, this Note
proposes that the courts should uphold the ESA even in the incidental taking situation
presented in the hypothetical.
276. Note that ESA § 9 does not distinguish between direct and incidental takings.
See supra note 27.
277. See supra note 27.
278. See Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975).
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gered species on Indian reservations come to light. This Note argues that
because of the nature of the ESA as a federal conservation statute of
general applicability, section 9 should prohibit both incidental and direct
takings.
Jennifer M. Regis-Civetta*
* JD. 1996, Washington University.
1996]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/11
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/11
